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Shiite Aid Organizations
in Tajikistan
Rasht is a relatively remote part of 
Tajikistan, with a physical geography 
dominated by the Western Pamirs. 
The area consists of several districts 
with a joint territory of 18,000 square 
kilometres and an official population 
of 360,000, most of whom are Hannafi 
Sunni Muslims. During the Tajik civil 
war (1992–1997), much of the Rasht 
region was controlled by commanders 
affiliated to the United Tajik Opposi-
tion (UTO). It was cut off from the rest 
of the country until mid-2001 because 
of irregular militia activity along the roads that link it to the capital. The 
economy, based on agriculture and fruit farming, has received a major 
boost over the last few years by the reopening of transport links and 
the remittances from seasonal labour migrants, primarily to Russia. 
The ties with Russia that already existed in the Soviet era further 
intensified due to the economic crisis in Tajikistan and labour short-
ages in some parts of Russia since 1999. According to State Migration 
Agency statistics, the Rasht area had some twenty-five thousand reg-
istered emigrants during the first quarter of 2006—the actual number 
is likely to be much higher. As the functioning local markets and the 
range of goods for sale show, the influx of money generated abroad 
creates new purchasing power, stimulating the appearance of banks, 
money transfer services, and mobile phone coverage in district centres 
where there were no basic financial services and communications until 
two or three years ago. 
From community mobilization …
Between 1992 and 2001, much of Rasht’s population survived on hu-
manitarian aid provided by various UN, Western, and Muslim aid organ-
izations. Those still active today have gradually switched to long-term 
development and community mobilization programmes. One exam-
ple is the Aga Khan Development Network and its Mountain Societies 
Development Support Programme 
(MSDSP). The MSDSP started in 
1993 in Kuhistan-i-Badakhshan, a 
province in Tajikistan with a sub-
stantial percentage of Ismaili Shi-
ites.1 The MSDSP served as a frame-
work to switch from relief activities 
to agricultural and infrastructure 
development. By providing train-
ing, technical assets, and grants and 
micro-credits, it aimed to assist in-
dividual farmers to cope with the collapse of the Soviet state farms, the 
privatization of land, and to promote self-reliance and diversification. 
As the MSDSP expanded and its focus on individual citizens showed 
to be of limited success, community mobilization became increasingly 
important. Since 1998, the main mobilization channels are the so-called 
Village Organizations (VO), a concept used by the Aga Khan Rural Sup-
port Programme in Pakistan’s Northern Areas and Chitral district since 
1982. The VO group representatives of each of the village’s households 
receive training and ad hoc technical support from MSDSP. Each VO 
has a number of working groups on specific issues such as finance and 
accounting, animal husbandry, or irrigation. 
The VO’s task is to identify needs and mobilize resources for local 
initiatives that are to contribute to raising living standards in the vil-
lage or neighbourhood. Until 2004, the VO also served as a conduit for 
micro-credits yet this service is now provided by the AKDN-affiliated 
First Micro-Finance Bank. To promote social cohesion and self-reliance, 
the VO approach tries to instrumental-
ize existing kinship ties and informal 
authorities, for example village elders, 
clan heads, village mullahs, profession-
als, and key figures in the local formal 
and informal economy.
According to MSDSP project statis-
tics, as of late 2006 the VO programme 
in the Rasht valley area operates in 389 
villages with over 47,000 beneficiaries 
in total. About 180 projects have been 
realized or approved, eighty per cent of 
which involved the upgrading of irriga-
tion channels, roads, and bridges. Two trends can be observed more 
recently. First, some of the older Village Organizations identified other 
partners besides MSDSP in order to diversify their sponsorship base. 
Second, besides infrastructure there seems to be an increasing trend 
to invest in income generation projects for vulnerable groups, like the 
construction of a safflower mill, the distribution of chickens to poor, 
female-headed households, or the layout of an orchard. 
… to charity work
The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF) represents an entirely 
different approach. The IKRF started to work in Tajikistan during the war 
in mid-1995. Though officially a foundation and not a state institution, 
the IKRF is one of the main channels for social welfare in Iran as well 
as the Iranian government’s main conduit for international humani-
tarian aid. It has five field offices in Tajikistan and plans for two more. 
According to its statistics, the IKRF assists 6,000 needy households in 
the country, totalling some 35,000 beneficiaries. The foundation’s key 
target group are widows and orphans–a focal group in Islamic charity–
and poor female-headed households. The latter are indeed a relatively 
substantial group in Rasht and other parts of Tajikistan due to the civil 
war and, more recently, labour migration.
The IKRF’s field office in Garm is one of three in the Rasht valley and 
covers the districts of Garm, Tajikabad, 
and Jirgital. It has four employees and 
has a much more discrete profile than 
the MSDSP with which, as far as we 
know, it has no operational contacts. 
Its activities in the area reflect the IKRF 
programme in Tajikistan and have no 
community mobilization or training 
approach. Initially, it provided humani-
tarian assistance to one hundred fami-
lies of war widows, gradually expand-
ing to the present five hundred. The beneficiaries receive bi-monthly 
food and household packages, usually until a son reaches majority age. 
Part of the food and household products which are distributed by the 
IKRF is purchased from local markets, part is imported from Iran. The 
IKRF Garm branch provides similar assistance to some sixty pensioners 
as well as a number of stipends to children from poor households who 
attend school in Garm.
Another IKRF activity is the repair of houses of widows and poor fami-
lies. At the time of research, this was planned for 30 dwellings in the 
Garm branch area. One of the IKRF’s more peculiar activities is the pro-
vision of marriage trousseaus and household sets to girls from needy 
families who plan to marry. According to its data, the IKRF assisted 250 
newlyweds in Tajikistan this way and planned to assist another 750 
in late 2006 and 2007. The IKRF also organizes activities like iftar (fast 
breaking) meals during Ramadan and offers help to widows and pen-
sioners with administrative formalities. To ensure that the funds reach 
In the global periphery and (post-)conflict 
areas, faith-based aid organizations play an 
important role as providers of social services. 
The activities of the Aga Khan Development 
Network and the Imam Khomeini Relief 
Foundation in the former Soviet republic of 
Tajikistan reflect different backgrounds and 
approaches used by Muslim aid organizations. 
They also outline how these organizations 
obtained a foothold and gained legitimacy 
in environments that do not share their 
confessional background.
[H]umanitarian needs … resulted 
in a certain indifference towards the 
origin or “denomination” of aid …
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targeted groups, the foundation’s local staff study the social and finan-
cial situation of applicants. 
Beyond sectarianism
That both the Aga Khan Development Network and the Imam Kho-
meini Relief Foundation are called “Shiite organizations” means that 
they have been founded by, and are linked to, a Shiite establishment. 
In the case of the AKDN, this establishment is the Ismaili Imamate and, 
as such, the wider Ismaili Shiite community which has the peculiarity 
of being a non-territorial diaspora. For the IKRF, in contrast, it is Iran’s 
official-clerical establishment and as such, a state and its interests. This 
does not mean that the bulk of their staff and beneficiaries are Shiite or 
that they have an agenda of spreading the Ismaili or Imami (Twelver) 
brands of Shiite Islam among non-Shiite populations. There are actu-
ally no indicators or anecdotal evidence that either one of the organi-
zations is involved in such activities in Rasht. In terms of staffing, the 
vast majority of both organization’s staff and cadres are from the Rasht 
area and, as such, of Sunni background.
As far as the Rasht goes, the AKDN-MSDSP and the IKRF clearly have 
different beneficiary niches. On the whole, their impact in terms of di-
rect employment and income generation is limited as compared to the 
importance of labour migration and remittances thereof. Nonetheless, 
they are important in the public field, given the gap left by the collapse 
of the Soviet welfare state and the technical-financial incapability of 
the present state to take over its role, especially in more remote areas. 
Programmes like MSDSP’s community mobilization are also instrumen-
tal in breaking off the culture of dependence and help cope with stark 
social changes ranging from the demise of the Soviet state farm sys-
tem to the increase in female-headed households due to civil war and 
migration. More “classical” charity like that offered by the IKRF has a 
certain niche and added value among extremely marginalized parts of 
society and focuses more on short-term needs. Yet, both beneficiary 
groups overlap since part of the IKRF’s beneficiaries are members of 
MSDSP-supported Village Organizations.
The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, being linked to and funded 
by Iranian government-affiliated actors (even though it is registered 
as a non-governmental organization) pretty much operates on its 
own, is not integrated in the wider development community, and fits 
into a wider interest consolidation movement by the Iranian govern-
ment in Tajikistan. This also includes the import of Iranian goods and 
the co-funding and implementation of a number of transport and hy-
droelectric projects. As the IKRF cadres interviewed stressed, the IKRF 
considers itself pan-Islamic and non-sectarian and illustrated this by 
pointing to activities among other needy non-Shiite Muslims, like in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina.
By contrast, the Aga Khan Development Network and MSDSP co-op-
erate with a number of international donors like the Canadian Interna-
tional Development Agency and the UK’s Department for International 
Development. Their expansion into non-Shiite areas (and non-Ismaili in 
particular) like Rasht also reflects a rationale. The AKDN is generally a 
vehicle for social advancement and economic power for the Ismaili mi-
nority in Tajikistan as it is in other countries where it operates. A project 
coordinator working on conflict prevention found that Ismailis form a 
large part of the staff of AKDN and MSDSP as compared to their overall 
share in the population, which is normal since they are related to the 
Ismaili leadership and were active in Ismaili areas first. Their expansion 
into non-Ismaili areas over a number of years is strategically motivated: 
first, all Ismaili areas in the country are already covered and have lit-
tle room for expansion; second, if the AKDN would be perceived to 
privilege only one community it might cause sectarian tensions where 
there are none; and third, being non-exclusive is also important to its 
international donors.
Legitimacy in a non-Shiite context 
The AKDN-MSDSP and the IKRF are the only Muslim aid organizations 
that have operated in the Rasht valley since the civil war. The fact that 
they are of Shiite rather than Sunni background like the near-totality of 
the population raises the question of how their presence is perceived 
and how they gained legitimacy with both the authorities and the pop-
ulation for long-term activities. When both the MSDSP and the IKRF 
started to work in Rasht in the late nineties, this was still a conflict area 
largely under UTO control. Major obstacles were the numerous check-
posts set up by governmental and opposition militias and the suspi-
cions and arbitrariness of individual commanders. Much of the access 
and legitimacy building in UTO territory went through ad hoc arrange-
ments with commanders, often on the basis of personal networks. One 
example mentioned during the research is that of an UTO commander 
from Tajikabad who was sympathetic to the “Ismaili” MSDSP because of 
his spouse’s Ismaili origins. 
The post-conflict Tajikistan’s secular regime, for its part, seems more 
comfortable with Shiite aid organizations for these are unlikely to 
propagate militant forms of Sunni Islam—adhered to by part of the 
UTO at the time—among Rasht’s predominantly Sunni population. 
What about the grassroots level? Two factors seem to determine the 
perception of Shiite aid organizations in Rasht: first, the acute humani-
tarian needs, caused by the collapse of the Soviet economy, political 
instability, and economic blockade, which resulted in a certain indiffer-
ence towards the origin or “denomination” of aid (an attitude needing 
to be understood in light of the striking absence at the time of Sunni 
humanitarian actors, in particular, of those from the Gulf ); second, due 
to the suppression of religious practice and clerics among Sunnis, Shi-
ites, as well as Ismailis in the Soviet Union, there is no strong sectar-
ian consciousness among the population. So despite the ambivalent 
attitudes towards religion, aid, and development in former Soviet en-
vironments and the non-Shiite background of their beneficiaries, the 
described organizations have gained legitimacy by partly filling the 
void left by a dysfunctional state and by appealing to a non-sectarian 
Muslim philanthropic discourse.
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Notes
1. Ismaili Shiites form 2.8 percent of Tajikistan’s 
population of some 7 million. Most live in 
the province of Kuhistan-i-Badakhshan and 
in the capital of Dushanbe.
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